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Abstract
The inclusion of personal experience in academic work, especially in the medical 
humanities, has increased markedly in the recent past. This article traces the roots of 
this development, arguing that it is not a simply of-shoot of ‘experts by experience’ 
in mental health, but has its own speciic set of precursors and enabling conditions. 
Three of these are explored in detail, under the headings of ‘psychoanalysis’, ‘social 
history’ and ‘anthropology’. The continuing inluence of psychoanalysis privileges 
the public expression of personal experience as a vital tool and site for self-develop-
ment. Social history (from the 1960s onwards) takes ‘experience’ as its privileged 
object in understanding the past. The tools of twentieth-century anthropology ani-
mate much social constructionist and cultural history. This anthropology is based 
upon the ‘lived experience’ of the anthropologists, who immerse themselves into the 
life-world of the ‘natives’. The article concludes by cautioning against the unthink-
ing or naïve use of experience as a sure foundation for work in the medical humani-
ties, drawing upon the theoretical insights of Joan Scott, Judith Butler and Sarah 
Shortall.
Keywords Psychoanalysis · Social history · Anthropology · Lived experience · 
Experts by experience
Technically, anything remembered, perceived, felt or encountered might qualify as 
‘personal experience’. However, only certain kinds of things are habitually mobi-
lized under that particular banner. Events remembered and bestowed with a par-
ticular kind of signiicance qualify as experience. These events often function like 
a badge or marker for certain groups: experience as a psychiatric inpatient, or as a 
suferer from depression are the kinds of things that count. In recent years, this pow-
erful category has been mobilized increasingly as part of academic work, especially 
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in the sociology and history of medicine and psychiatry (e.g. Costa et al. 2012; Cal-
lard 2014).
In a related development, one of the most important changes in mental health 
policy and practice over the last two decades is the rise of the ‘expert by experience’. 
This has been subject to signiicant scrutiny, particularly by practitioners connected 
to social work (Beresford 2002; Preston-Shoot 2007; Scourield 2009; Noorani 
2013). However, in both of these developments, the signiicance of the term ‘experi-
ence’ is elusive. Pinning down a comprehensive deinition is diicult, yet it prolif-
erates. Tehseen Noorani has argued that the ‘experiential authority’ of experts by 
experience is ‘rooted in practices of self-help and peer-support’. Noorani traces this 
practice of ‘user involvement’ back to Community Health Councils in the 1970s, 
and then through the proliferation of satisfaction metrics in the 1980s (2013, pp. 
51–52) Peter Beresford argues that it goes back to public involvement in land-use 
planning in the 1960s (2002, p. 95). Both Noornai and Beresford draw attention to 
how this involvement is given impetus and traction by the political philosophy of the 
‘New Right’, with its emphasis on the ‘active citizen’ and the veneration of ‘choice’ 
as an organizing principle of social provision.
In the present article, I seek to contextualize the former development: the mobi-
lization of personal experience in academic writing on mental health. In one sense, 
this phenomenon could be read as a relatively simple ofshoot or outgrowth of 
‘expertise by experience’. In this reading, academics writing about mental health are 
simply taking their cues from experts by experience, and deploying their own expe-
riences in their academic writing. Indeed some academic writers also publicly iden-
tify as experts by experience (for example Diana Rose and her position as the irst 
Professor of User-Led Research at King’s College London). However, I do not think 
that the relationship between the two is that simple. Two intertwined and contradic-
tory threads inform the presence of ‘experts by experience’ in healthcare: consumer 
feedback on the one hand, and the critical—oppositional—survivor movement on 
the other (Beresford 2002). I do not see much of these in the mobilization of per-
sonal experience in academic work on mental health. Instead, I see the academic 
uses of experience emerging (primarily) out of three much broader and distinct, but 
overlapping developments. First, there is the continuing inluence of psychoanalysis 
that privileges the public expression of personal experience as a vital tool and site 
for self-development. Second, there is the inluence of social history from the 1960s 
that takes ‘experience’ as its privileged object in understanding the past. Finally, 
the tools of twentieth-century anthropology animate much social constructionist and 
cultural history. This anthropology is based upon the hard-won lived experience of 
the anthropologist, who immerses themselves into the life-world of the ‘natives’, 
experiencing this culture from ‘the inside’. In all these senses, ‘experience’ becomes 
part of public, scholarly, and academic relevance.
This genealogy obviously misses out huge swathes of work on experience, 
from the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger (2010) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
(1962), to the standpoint feminisms of Dorothy Smith and Sandra Harding (e.g. 
Smith 1992; Harding 1992) Part of the reason for this is simply lack of space and 
expertise, but there is another more important reason. ‘Experience’ as deployed in 
academic work has a speciic genealogy, speciic roots. The term experience is so 
Using personal experience in the academic medical humanities:…
multivalent and ambiguous, each diferent set of uses requires a diferent geneal-
ogy. I am not starting at a generalized concept of experience and applying it to the 
academic work; I am starting at the academic work and tracing backwards. All the 
things that might conceivably it under the term ‘experience’ in contemporary schol-
arship are too varied to have any coherence.
Many articles in this special issue involve insightful accounts of their authors’ 
experience(s), for various analytical and rhetorical ends. Sarah Chaney’s book on 
the history of self-harm, Psyche on the Skin (2017), is bookended by her experiences 
in a manner that enriches the argument, bringing issues into focus and situating her 
arguments with verve and immediacy. My point in attempting this genealogy is not 
to demean or diminish such deployments of experience. Instead, I seek to do two 
things. First, I want to ask how we got to a place where self-consciously bringing 
personal experiences to bear in academic work is even a question. For that, I’ll lesh 
out the potted history lagged above, taking in psychoanalysis, social history and 
anthropology. Then I’ll ask: what are the consequences of this? What happens when 
we make ‘experience’ a touchstone of academic writing?
How did we get here?
How has it become possible and acceptable to mobilize ‘personal experience’ in 
academic work? Ian Hacking notes that ‘styles of reasoning create the possibil-
ity of truth or falsehood’ (1982, p. 56). Paul Rabinow—glossing this in the mid-
1980s—adds that ‘a style of thinking’ is something that ‘established the conditions 
for entertaining a proposition as being capable of being taken as true or false in 
the irst place’ (1986, p. 237). So, being a historian, I want to do a history of the 
‘style of reasoning’ or style of thinking’ that allows us to use personal experiences 
in academic work. Through which logics or justiications do we come to give assent 
or refusal to this question? (I take this approach partly because this ‘history of the 
question’ is more interesting than my personal answer to that question, which is sim-
ply: ‘if you want to do it, then do it—if you don’t, then don’t feel like you should’).
My genealogy of this version of experience proceeds under the following head-
ings: ‘the cases of psychoanalysis’, ‘the foundations of social history’ and ‘the prac-
tice of anthropology’. In all three sections, I shall attempt to show how a particular 
reading of experience comes to the fore in ways that link it to the contemporary use 
of ‘personal experience’ by academics writing in the ield of mental health. I shall 
then sketch out some of the consequences of this version of experience for academic 
writing.
The cases of psychoanalysis: making the personal public
One of the ways to crack open what ‘experience’ might mean in the medi-
cal humanities, and especially the history of psychiatry (which is my own area 
of expertise), is to analyse what a ‘clinical case’ is—as it isolates a patient and 
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seeks to describe them in their individuality, whilst also connecting them up to 
much broader categories (as exemplars of this pathology, or that complication, for 
example.)
One place to start with this is in the late nineteenth century with psychoanaly-
sis. Much of this section draws upon John Forrester’s brilliant paper ‘If p then 
what? Thinking in cases’ (1996). Forrester sheds light on the kinds of thinking 
in psychoanalysis, what he calls ‘thinking in cases’. Although Forrester’s focus 
is predominantly upon psychoanalysis, he admits early on that ‘psychoanalysis 
is only one culmination of a much broader movement whereby the life yields up 
its secrets’. He argues that bringing life systematically into focus ‘appears to be 
closely linked with the very idea of the compilation of a dossier’ (Forrester 1996, 
p. 11). (It is worth noting that when Forrester speaks of ‘life’ he is talking about 
individual life, biography, rather than the ‘life’ associated with ‘life sciences’ or 
‘biopolitics’.) Forrester then explores Foucault’s justly famous account of ‘the 
examination’ in Discipline and Punish. Foucault’s ambition is striking:
‘For a long time ordinary individuality - the everyday individuality of eve-
rybody – remained below the threshold of description. To be looked at, 
observed, described in detail, followed from day to day by an uninterrupted 
writing was a privilege… The disciplinary methods reversed this relation, 
lowered the threshold of describable individuality and made this description 
a means of control and a method of domination’ (Foucault 1977, p. 191).
The individual, the biographical, materializes as part of a network of techniques 
(named ‘disciplinary’ by Foucault) that seek to know, to measure, to control. This 
is one of the sources of what we might call ‘systematic’ biography. But where 
does this become relevant for bringing personal experience to academic work? 
Here psychoanalysis becomes important: not only is quotidian biography (‘the 
everyday individuality of everybody’) relevant, but the telling of one’s biography 
becomes relevant for its therapeutic potential.
Human beings become potentially known and self-knowing through biogra-
phy (rather than, for example their profession or their family lineage). They also 
might be healed through the telling of their biography. Judith Butler argues that
‘some have argued that the normative goal of psychoanalysis is to permit 
the client to tell a single and coherent story about herself that will satisfy 
the wish to know herself’ (Butler 2005: 51).
Not just one’s personal experience, but the telling of it, deploying it as coher-
ent, for a particular end is central in psychoanalysis. Crucially, it involves mak-
ing the experience public in some way. Forrester says that ‘psychoanalytic 
discourse… attempts to render that way of telling a life public, of making it 
scientiic [through] the case-history’ (Forrester 1996, p. 10). One of Forrester’s 
last writings concerns anthropologist, psychiatrist, and early advocate of Freud, 
W.H.R. Rivers. He notes that Rivers realized early on that in writing about psy-
choanalysis, ‘one expose[s] one’s [own] life to the scientiic public’. (Forrester 
2012, p. 74). When personal experience is used in the medical humanities, part 
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of its relevance is that this experience is being mobilized in public, in published 
academic work. The experience that is central to psychoanalysis is therapeutic 
and public, as it is in uses of experience in the medical humanities.
Kaitlin Bell Barnett’s book Dosed is based around the experiences of a num-
ber of people who take anti-depressants. Barnett admits that she is inluenced 
by ‘the fact that I have been taking various medications for anxiety and depres-
sion for over a decade’ (2012, p. 24). The book ends with the aspiration that it 
will ‘encourage those who did grow up taking psychiatric drugs to share their 
ongoing experiences more openly’ (Barnett 2012, p. 208). Barbara Taylor claims 
that her memoir/history hybrid The Last Asylum is about ‘the work of turning 
the personal past into history’; she refers to herself as a primary source (Taylor 
2014, p. 15). Something similar is going on in Anne Cvetkovitch’s book Depres-
sion: A Public Feeling: ‘If I wrote about depression in the third person without 
saying anything of my personal experience of it, it felt like a key source of my 
thinking was missing (Cvetkovich 2012, p. 17). Here experience is emphasized 
as a ‘source’ and Cvetkovich also uses the language of personal ‘case history’ 
which again acts as a bridge between ‘personal experience’ and public, aca-
demic work.
The logics of Taylor, Cvetkovitch Barnett begin to sound like discussions 
around therapeutic communities from the mid-20th century. Two pioneers of the 
therapeutic community, Wilfred Bion and John Rickman, publish a Lancet arti-
cle in 1943 that opens with the claim that ‘The therapy of individuals assembled 
in groups… sometimes it turns mainly on the catharsis of public confession’ 
(Bion and Rickman 1943, p. 678). Therapeutic communities are not the only 
way this biographical, personal experience can become public and signiicant. 
Rhodri Hayward has shown how a biographical approach is key in twentieth-
century General Practice, bound up with psychological approaches. He notes 
that the founding 1900 issue of General Practitioner magazine cast the fam-
ily doctor’s insight in terms of ‘biographical expertise’ and that ‘this historical 
familiarity’ between doctor and patient ‘was the basis for a new kind of psycho-
logical intimacy’ (Hayward 2014, pp. 33–34). Biography and medicine are inter-
twined here too—one of the roots of the mobilization of personal experience in 
academic work.
Expressing one’s personal experiences—a form of biographical narration—is 
bound up with a number of clinical, psychological and psychoanalytic frames 
of reference, which render this public use intelligible and possible. And thus we 
can see that the value of publicizing personal experiences becomes and remains 
relevant through a particular historical trajectory, as part of a particular histori-
cal context. None of this should read as invalidating the practice of deploying 
personal experience in academic work; it does show part of how we got to where 
we are. Public utterance now meshes with personal biographical insight in ways 
that only really take shape in the twentieth century. Thus, personal experience 
has traction in academic work. This is the irst strand of the genealogy of the 
mobilization of personal experience in academic work.
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The foundations of social history: experience as raw material
Now we arrive at the second strand of these roots of the whole question of the 
‘mobilization of personal experience’. A reading of experience for academic his-
torians (the ield with which I am most familiar) comes to the fore in Edward 
Thompson’s toweringly inluential The Making of the English Working Class 
(1963). In the preface to this foundational text of social history, Thompson begins 
to seriously revise the standard Marxist and materialist approaches to history. He 
argues that ‘class’ is not a structure or a category or a thing, it is ‘something 
which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relation-
ships’. Elaborating on this, he claims that
‘class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inher-
ited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between 
themselves… Class-consciousness is the way in which these experiences are 
handled in cultural terms’ (Thompson 1963, pp. 8–9).
Experience here is central. Importantly it is a raw material, through which class 
emerges. Class and class consciousness are no longer simply functions of rela-
tions to the means of production (the orthodox Marxist view), but are built 
through shared experiences, as iltered through culture. This concept of ‘experi-
ence’ is therefore central to the new social history, or ‘history from below’, with 
which Thomson is associated. It is this kind of ‘experience’ that forms one of the 
foundations of the current practice of mobilizing biographical and personal detail 
in academic, historical work. It is this reading of ‘experience’—as the personal, 
cultural raw material of identity—that we are looking for.
Thompson is a useful exemplar because of the reach and inluence of his work, 
especially in history, but he is also used in work in the medical humanities that 
tackles the question of experience explicitly. In 1978, Thompson becomes even 
more explicit about experience when taking on one of the most inluential Marx-
ists of his time, French philosopher Louis Althusser. In his celebrated essay ‘The 
Poverty of Theory’ (1978), Thompson argues that ‘“Experience”… is breaking in 
and demanding that we reconstruct our categories’ (1978, p. 133). It appears as 
an agent for change when Thompson argues that ‘there has been a pressure of real 
experience which has seemed to license the adoption of a particular language of 
social and political analysis, an ideological predisposition towards one vocabu-
lary or another’ (Thompson 1978, p. 100). Experience here saturates everything, 
and goes right to the heart of Marxism:
‘experience is a necessary middle term between social being and social con-
sciousness: it is experience (often class experience) which gives a colora-
tion to culture, to values, and to thought: it is by means of experience that 
the mode of production exerts a determining pressure upon other activities’ 
(Thompson 1978, p. 137).
‘Experience’ as we understand it is a founding category of modern social history, 
and a central component of Thompsonian ‘history from below’.
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Roy Porter takes this notion to the history of medicine. At the end of his much-
cited article ‘The Patient’s View: Doing Medical History from Below’ he takes a dis-
paraging shot at what he calls ‘the “medicalization” theories of Foucault and Illich’. 
Porter mirrors Thompson in his distrust of large overarching systems of explanation, 
preferring to work at the individual or personal level Tellingly, neither Porter nor 
Thompson see ‘experience’—this privileging of the personal—as such a system or 
theory. Unsurprisingly, Porter cites Thompson approvingly and claims that ‘A peo-
ple’s history of sufering might restore to the history of medicine its human face’ 
(1985, p. 194). Elsewhere in the article Porter claims that ‘we need, for our various 
classes and communities, basic mappings of experience, their belief systems, images 
and symbols’ (Porter 1985, p. 186). Experience becomes central to the writing of 
history and to the history of medicine.
Porter’s call has been inluential. To take just one example, Jonathan Andrews 
heeds the call in a way that links to Forrester’s analysis of cases. Andrews uses 
records at Gartnavel Royal Asylum, Glasgow, to provide a sensitive analysis of ‘how 
case notes and other asylum records become case histories… deployed for promo-
tional and educative purposes, to generate public support and funding for the asy-
lum’ (Andrews 1998, p. 281). Alongside this sophisticated account of the use of 
case notes (and note again their explicit public function), he also argues that ‘case 
notes constitute an especially important and extensive resource. They may provide 
the surest basis we have for understanding the changing nature of the experience of 
insane asylums since 1800’ (Andrews 1998, p. 255). Experience and cases remain 
intertwined here.
Thompson is also inluential in other areas. An important, complicated and rich 
article by Mark Cresswell and Helen Spandler, ‘Academic Intellectuals and the Psy-
chiatric Survivor Movement’, cites Thompson in 2013, calling ‘The Poverty of The-
ory’ ‘magisterial’. They argue that an academic should be
‘“deeply engaged”. And deep engagement, far from being a philosophical 
problem, is a human practice – a “lived contradiction” involving all the unset-
tled relations which are subsequently engaged. A “lived contradiction” is a 
“lived experience”; and it is at the level of “experience” that its “evaluation” 
needs to be made.’ (Cresswell and Spandler 2013, pp. 151–152)
This is a diicult argument to parse, but clearly they see a problem with philosophi-
cal theorizing about experience—they set up a ‘contradiction’ between ‘theory 
and experience’, and favour a text that uses such personal experiences. They praise 
Kathryn Church’s Forbidden Narratives: Critical Autobiography as Social Science 
(1995) for its inclusion of an account of ‘personal breakdown’ which enables her to 
have ‘deep engagement’ (Cresswell and Spandler 2013, pp. 148–149). Clearly they 
do not see their focus on ‘experience’ to have theoretical baggage or implications of 
its own. Thompson’s critique buttresses ‘expereince’ and foregrounds it here; thus, it 
explicitly informs academic practice in the medical humanities.
So from these tangled threads of social history, class experience and culture, back 
to public case histories and psychological therapeutics, experience is again cen-
tral. This forms something of a general and pervasive background upon which late 
twentieth-century valorizations of the ‘experiences’ of service users operates. The 
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recasting of these experiences into ‘experts by experience’ and the mobilization of 
personal experience in academic work are both rooted in these developments. As 
‘experience’ becomes such a valued category, indeed forming the bedrock for the 
discipline of history, this opens up the possibility for the academic’s own experience 
to become relevant. If the object of one’s academic enquiry is the experience of oth-
ers, it is not a huge step to consider one’s own experiences. (A set of prompts and 
inluences that make that step more likely to be taken are considered below.)
We can see this in anthropologist Emily Martin’s book Bipolar Expeditions 
(2007) where she writes engagingly on the history and experience of bipolar disor-
der. She opens with the haunting lines: ‘I have done ethnographic projects before, 
but none has tapped into my personal experience as deeply as this one did’ (Martin 
2007, p. 15). She wants to understand bipolar disorder ‘in a broader cultural and his-
torical context in order to shed light on the experience of having manic depression’ 
(Martin 2007, p. 18). Here are the familiar strands of personal experience, linked to 
an understanding of historical and cultural context. In fact, the academic work she is 
doing, the ‘history’ and ‘culture’, are reduced to tools to understand the ‘experience’ 
of having had manic depression. The personal experience is deployed as an implied 
motive for writing the book. But it is not just that personal experience is used and 
mobilized here—the point of the book is to shed light on that experience. It is tell-
ing that Martin refers to ethnographic study, for this is the third plank of my account 
here. It is ethnography and anthropology that provide a strong set of inluences and 
prompts for authors to deploy their personal experiences. Psychoanalysis brings per-
sonal experience into the realm of the academic, the realm of serious, useable, pub-
lic knowledge; ‘history from below’ casts experience as the object of scholarship 
and the basis of class and culture. Anthropology brings the author’s experience to 
the fore in a new way.
The practice of anthropology
Anthropology enjoys a remarkable surge in prestige in the early twentieth century, 
practised by W.H.R. Rivers, Bronislaw Malinowski, Margaret Mead, Mary Doug-
las, and others. Anthropological insight about the power of culture and environment 
in human life still forms the basis of many social sciences, and in fact underwrites 
many of the claims of postmodern and poststructuralist thought (Millard 2017; Mil-
lard, forthcoming). James Cliford’s introductory essay in the inluential anthro-
pological collection Writing Culture (1986a) addresses perhaps the most crucial 
methodological technique in anthropology: participant-observation. Cliford argues 
that since the early twentieth century in anthropology ‘the “method” of participant-
observation has enacted a delicate balance of subjectivity and objectivity’. He claims 
that the ‘ethnographer’s personal experiences, especially those of participation and 
empathy, are recognized as central to the research process, but [in the early part of 
the century] they are irmly restrained by the impersonal standards of observation 
and “objective” distance’ (Cliford 1986a, p. 13). This objective distance begins to 
give way, unevenly, to accounts that foreground personal experience as the century 
progresses.
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Vincent Debaene has written an excellent book on French anthropology, trans-
lated into English in 2014 as Far Afield: French Anthropology between Science and 
Literature. He notes such a shift in anthropological method in the mid twentieth cen-
tury. The anthropological project is transformed from collecting objects and writ-
ing positivist classiications, to the idea that ‘the anthropologist went to the ield to 
immerse himself, to soak up another culture, to “live from the inside” the experi-
ence of the “native”’. This constitutes, according to Dabaene, a ‘privileging of the 
personal, concrete and psychological aspects of ield experiences’ (Debaene 2014). 
Further, this section of Debaene’s book can be found under the index entry: ‘ield-
work, as lived experience’. The personal and lived experience are central, but this is 
not simply Thompson’s ‘history from below’ or Porter’s ‘patient’s view’—it is not 
simply the experience of the ‘natives’ that is the issue here. The anthropologist’s 
self/personhood is implicated.
Cliford observes that since the 1960s anthropology has not been able to sus-
tain the tension between the self-conscious participant observer, and the academic 
demands to adhere to the idioms of the physical sciences. He claims that this is 
shown by the emergence of ‘self-relexive “ieldwork account” [which is] Variously 
sophisticated and naïve, confessional and analytic’. In these accounts, ‘the rhetoric 
of experienced objectivity yields to that of the autobiography and the ironic self-
portrait’ (Cliford 1986a, p. 14). In fact, Debaene’s whole book is set up on the ten-
sion between the anthropologists’ academic writing and the rising phenomenon of a 
more confessional, personal account of their voyages, something he calls ‘the eth-
nographer’s two books’.
Here we see another bridge—like the shift from ‘case notes’ to ‘case study’ 
described by Andrews—where the ethnographer’s personal experience becomes 
more relevant in a public, published, scholarly setting. At irst this relevance is 
uncertain in anthropology, as these experiences are packaged and published in dif-
ferent ways to the conventional scholarly outputs. As Debaene observes, it is a ‘curi-
ous fact’ that a particular group of ethnographers, trained by Marcel Mauss in the 
1920s and 1930s ‘wrote, upon their return, not only a scholarly study of the people 
they lived with but often a second book as well, a more “literary” work that did 
not adhere to the canonical forms of the scholarly monograph’ (Debaene 2014, p. 
4). This is not a new observation—historian of anthropology George Stocking has 
noted how ‘the “self-relexive” autobiographical account of ieldwork experiences 
has emerged as a distinct ethnographic genre’ since the 1960s (Stocking 1992, p. 
13). The author’s self is deployed, irst as an adjunct to scholarly work, and then as 
part of it. As Cliford writes in the 1980s ‘[t]he ieldworker, typically, starts from 
scratch, from a research experience, rather than from reading or transcribing’ (Clif-
ford 1986b, p. 117).
This anthropological move is not insulated from history and the humanities more 
generally (for more on this link, see Millard, forthcoming). (My focus is on his-
tory as it is my disciplinary home, not because I believe it to be the most important 
part of the humanities.) Martin Jay argues that ‘the “thick descriptions” advocated 
by cultural anthropologists like Cliford Geertz and Victor Turner served as a vital 
inspiration [for historians]. Either as a site of mystiication or a locus of resistance 
(or both at once), the “everyday” became a privileged arena for cultural historians 
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with a critical bent and a distaste for rareied discourses and exclusive institutions’. 
(2005, p. 243). Thus, experience becomes even more central to academic work, 
especially in history, but also in the social sciences and humanities.
This account—encompassing psychoanalytic cases, history from below, and 
anthropology is unashamedly partial; there is plenty more to say here, many other 
roots to this tendency and other routes through these inluences. The point here is 
not to attempt being comprehensive, but to be tolerably coherent. To take just a 
few other examples, the rise of autobiography and its relation to history; the use 
of diaries as historical sources; recent discussions of what have been called ‘ego-
documents’. All these would be fruitful avenues to explore (see e.g. Paperno 2004; 
Hellbeck 2004; Aurell 2006; Wallach 2006; Fulbrook and Rublack 2010). To take 
an example from this list of works, Jaume Aurell seeks to use autobiographical texts 
as historiographical sources; he connects autobiographies written by historians to 
the histories that they write. He does this to ‘examine to what extent the scholarly 
production of historians has been conditioned by personal experience’ and he inds 
that, yes indeed, the ‘ostensibly intellectual exercise’ of writing an autobiography 
‘is actually more governed by personal experiences than previously believed’ (Aurel 
2006, pp. 426–427). We can see the mobilization of experience as a valued category 
of analysis—although this time not the author’s own, but at one remove.
However, we should now recap and proceed to the implications. We began think-
ing in cases, drawing from Michel Foucault’s dossiers and systematic biography, 
which becomes developed into a therapeutic instrument in psychoanalysis, although 
the public and practical uses of biographical experience also feature in general prac-
tice and therapeutic communities. The notion of experience also becomes the foun-
dation for a new kind of (social) history, the object of a new way of writing about 
the past. This has the potential to make one’s own experiences come into focus as 
part of academic history, and this privileging of experience has been taken up by 
some scholars looking at the history of mental health movements. Finally, anthro-
pology and the immersion of the anthropologist in another culture keeps the self 
central, with the idea of using oneself as a tool, self-consciously and relexively in 
academic work. The inluence of this anthropological turn—especially using the 
work of Cliford Geertz—has been hugely inluential in history and the humanities. 
The mobilization of personal experience by academics is one particular outgrowth 
of these historical threads; when academics use their personal experience in their 
published work, they are building upon these varied foundations, participating in 
this historical traditions.
The consequences of experience
So, what is the point of all this? Having sketched this history, what are the conse-
quences of mobilizing personal experience in histories of mental health? In Giv-
ing an Account of Oneself, Judith Butler argues that whenever one gives such an 
account, it always ‘takes place in relation to an imposed set of norms… There is… 
no self-making outside of the norms that orchestrate the possible forms that a subject 
may take’ (Butler 2005, pp. 17, 19). One’s self is always crafted with the resources 
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available, within the contexts and conventions operation at the time. I have tried to 
expose part of these ‘possible forms’: three ways in which historical context bears 
down on the mobilization of biographical experience in academic work.
To sketch out the consequences, I want to lean on a fantastic essay by Joan Scott. 
All too often, Scott says, experience ‘serves as a way… of claiming knowledge that 
is unassailable’ (Scott 1991, p. 797). This kind of deployment of ‘experience’ is 
the one used by Kay Redield Jamieson, international clinical authority on manic-
depressive illness, and also someone who identiies as a suferer from that illness. 
Jamieson has claimed that that ‘I have become fundamentally and deeply skeptical 
that anyone who does not have this illness can truly understand it’ (Jamieson 1995, 
p. 171). This is also precisely the kind of claim made in the name of experience 
by those in critical studies of autobiography, which sometimes treat experience in a 
puzzlingly uncritical manner, as ‘peculiarly direct and faithful’ (Olney 1980, p. 13).
Rather than closing down, I wish to pursue a scholarly practice where experi-
ence, in Scott’s words: ‘is not the origin of our explanation, but that which we want 
to explain’ (Scott 1991; p. 797). Recently, Scott’s essay has been parsed brilliantly 
by Sarah Shortall, who brings together Edward Thompson’s notions of experience 
with those of the 1960s psychedelic counterculture. Shortall follows Scott in argu-
ing that ‘each appeal to the rhetoric of experience involves a choice as to what is 
authentic and central to that experience and what is ancillary to it—a choice which 
can always be challenged by competing claims to experiential authenticity’ (Shortall 
2014, p. 204). So as well as being historically contingent, there are costs and ben-
eits to deploying experience; there is a certain politics of authenticity going on with 
experience; there are historical and intellectual structures (often hidden and unartic-
ulated) that shape what experience does and what it signiies. The post-structuralist, 
genealogical, Foucauldian history that I try to practise is important to me because it 
exposes the vast intellectual and practical ways in which our most private inner life, 
our most potent experiences are always already parsed, structured and interpreted in 
ways that we do not choose. Butler and Scott are extremely helpful in teasing this 
out. Leon Antonio Rocha, in a recent analysis of Michel Foucault’s engagement with 
the concept of experience, asks
‘when we say we want to listen to and recapture marginalized voices, are we 
implicitly assuming to be able to hear these voices without the ilter of power? 
Are we suspending our disbelief and thinking that there can be utterances that 
are not already saturated by power in some way? Are we pinning our false 
hope on some kind of “reality” to be recovered that is untouched or uncon-
taminated by power?’ (Rocha 2012, p. 211)
Whilst dissenting from the idea that all utterances are ‘saturated’ by power, I would 
agree that in order to speak at all, there must be some sort of platform, some sort of 
power in play. This power deserves our attention and our thoughtful critique, even if 
we are then to use it. I would hope that it doesn’t need saying that making personal 
experience part of academic accounts requires signiicant courage in a society where 
mental ill-health is still stigmatized. It is an act of inclusion and solidarity that is to 
be lauded in many ways. But it also leaves something out, and this is crucial. Butler 
is clear on this:
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‘What is left out if we assume, as some do, that narrative gives us the life 
that is ours, or that life takes place in narrative form? The “I” who begins to 
tell its story can only tell it according to speciic forms of life narration… 
If I give an account and I give it to you, then my narrative depends upon a 
structure of address. But if I can address you, I must irst have already been 
addressed, brought into the structure of address as a possibility of language 
before I was able to ind my own way to make use of it… the very pos-
sibility of linguistic agency is derived from a situation in which one inds 
oneself addressed by a language one never chose’ (Butler 2005, pp. 52–53).
When we deploy experience, we depend upon huge sprawling intellectual systems 
that make this action intelligible. This is what Butler calls ‘structures of address’. 
This ability to speak, to draw upon personal experience, to have agency, is not a sim-
ple assertion of power or individuality or inluence. It is already only a possibility 
because it resides within structures of ideas that we have been tracing. Butler is clear 
on the fact that we are already embedded in these systems and should therefore take 
a look at them to see how they guide and shape what we are able to say. Joan Scott 
spells this out when talking about experience speciically. She writes that through
‘this kind of appeal to experience as uncontestable evidence and as an origi-
nary point of explanation… these studies lose the possibility of examining 
those assumptions and practices that excluded considerations of diference 
in the irst place. They take as self-evident the identities of those whose 
experience is being documented and thus naturalize their diference. They 
locate resistance outside its [experience’s] discursive construction and reify 
agency as an inherent attribute of individuals, thus decontextualizing it’ 
(Scott 1991, p. 777).
Therefore, when analysing these ‘structures of address’, it is to ind what they 
exclude, the assumptions that they are built on, the way that they naturalize difer-
ence. Jamieson’s idea that one has to have experienced manic depression in order 
to truly understand it is actually a striking assertion of the essential diference of 
all those who have experienced manic depression. It might not always be helpful 
to put such a strong barrier in between humans, to put it mildly. Yes, ‘experience’ 
can deliver a sense of agency, and a voice and a platform from which to speak, 
but it is a precarious one; it is built upon a commonsense appreciation of essential 
diference that can as easily ensnare as much as it seemingly liberates.
An article by Lucy Costa et  al. (2012) records and develops threads from ‘a 
community event organized in response to the appropriation and overreliance on 
the psychiatric patient’s “personal story.”’ They argue that these accounts have 
been appropriated to further the interests of mental health organizations, and 
in the process have become examples of ‘disability tourism’ and ‘patient porn’ 
(Costa et  al. 2012, p. 85) They reproduce the testimony of one participant who 
attempts to use these narratives to focus upon systemic oppression.
In our research, if we listen only for the “lived experience” of individuals, 
and only for processes of illness and recovery—we will miss many other 
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vital storylines. We need to complicate what we are listening for: to listen 
less for stories of healing and recovery and more for stories of resistance 
and opposition, collective action and social change. (Costa et  al. 2012, p. 
96)
This is an important point, not because everyone should be looking for systemic 
oppression, but because it shows how ‘lived experience’ might obscure certain nar-
ratives or analytical outcomes, at the same time as it foregrounds others.
From the above consideration of ‘experience’ in academic writing about mental 
health, it is clear that the possibility of utilizing experience is constrained by history 
(i.e. only an intelligible tactic because of speciic historical and cultural currents). It 
is also potentially constraining: built upon a profound sense of diference and divi-
sion, marking of those who are ‘experienced’ in ways that are potentially stigma-
tizing. It seems ironic indeed that the inclusion of ‘expertise by experience’ might 
even be contributing to the stigmatization of those whose experiences are mobi-
lized, by marking them of as essentially diferent and special. It certainly prevents 
us from asking about how diference is established in the irst place, and how we 
might imagine (and then work towards) a world where these diferences (between 
those with experience of mental health services, and those without) might become 
unnecessary.
Thus, when ‘personal experience’ is used in academic work, we should be aware 
of how implicated it is in a set of contingent histories, and how, through these his-
tories, it comes with a tendency towards naturalizing diference. In this sense, its 
authenticity and interiority is historically speciic and potentially hazardous. It can 
also be a powerful act of solidarity and courage in a context where mental ill-health 
is often stigmatized and hidden. I mentioned at the start that I don’t think the deploy-
ment of personal experience in academic work is a simple ofshoot of the rise of 
‘experts by experience’. This latter group has—as noted—been theorized as coming 
out of consumer groups (on the one hand) and the more adversarial and critical sur-
vivor movements (on the other). In contrast to this, I do think that academic deploy-
ments of personal experiences arise through the developments I have traced here: 
psychoanalysis, social history and cultural anthropology. It is also possible that these 
three threads also feed into expertise by experience; it is certain that similar pitfalls 
in the deployment of authenticity might also bedevil these experts. However, there 
is a limit to what can be attempted in a short article. As it stands, the preliminary 
genealogy to ‘experience as deployed in academic work’ is hopefully a useful begin-
ning point; it is certainly not intended to be the last word. I hope to have started a 
conversation where instead of simply producing a history of personal experience in 
academic work, I have begun to sketch the conditions governing the way in which 
the relation to oneself can constitute the possibility of deploying such experience.1
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